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Abstract: This paper considers the possibility of using adaptive learning and 
mistakes to select a unique equilibrium in signaling games. It is assumed that 
players are boundedly rational in that they use an adaptive rule to update their 
beliefs. Moreover, they sometimes make mistakes and choose an action at 
random. By computer simulation it is shown that, when players do not make 
mistakes, the equilibrium selected depends on the initial distribution of beliefs. 





























































































This paper considers the possibility of using adaptive learning and 
mistakes to select a unique equilibrium in extensive form games with 
incomplete information. The simplest class of games with incomplete 
information is that of signaling games (see next section). They have been 
widely used in economics (e.g. Spence, 1974; Grossman, 1981; Kreps-Wilson, 
1982b; Milgrom-Roberts, 1982 and 1986). Typically, signaling games have 
multiple (sequential) equilibria. The approach followed in the literature to 
reduce this multiplicity has been to impose restrictions on out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs. Cho-Kreps (1987) and Banks-Sobel (1987) analyze the power of 
strategic stability (Kohlberg-Mertens, 1986) to select among equilibria in 
signaling games.
Here a different approach is followed. It is assumed that players are 
boundedly rational in that they use an adaptive rule to update their beliefs. 
Moreover, they sometime make mistakes and choose an action at random.
By computer simulations it is shown that, when players do not make 
mistakes, the equilibrium selected depends on the initial distribution of beliefs. 
When the probability of mistakes is positive the learning dynamics selects for 
strategic stability. This is similar to Fudenberg-Kreps (1988). In their model 
players are boundedly rational and deviations are the result of conscious 
experimentation by the players. They claim 1 that by imposing restrictions on 
players’ experimentation procedures refinements of sequential equilibrium can 
be justified.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: the next section 
introduces signaling games; section 2 considers an example; the model is 
presented in section 3 and in section 4 the results of the simulations are 
illustrated; section 5 concludes.
1 Signaling Games2
Consider a signaling game between two players: the sender (S) and the 
receiver (R). Nature moves first, selecting one of a finite number of possible 
types for player S according to a strictly positive probability distribution 
p={p(t)>0 for all types teT  and SleTp(t)=l> which is common knowledge 
among the players. Player S is informed of nature’s choice and sends to player
‘In Fudenberg-Kreps, draft 0.11-July 1988, this is still a claim since no 
proof is given.
2For an introduction to signaling games see ch.8 of Fudenberg-Tirole (1991); 




























































































R an observable message m (the signal), chosen from the finite set M. The 
receiver then takes an action a, from the finite set A, in response to m without 
knowing the sender’s type but knowing p. After the game is over S gets a 
payoff us(t,m,a) and R gets uR(i,m,a). A strategy for S is a signaling rule m(f) 
which maps T into M (or into a probability distribution over M if mixed 
strategies are allowed). A strategy for R is an action rule a(m) which maps M 
into A (or into a probability distribution over A if mixed strategies are 
allowed)3.
In a signaling game an equilibrium must specify not only the best 
strategy for each player but also players’ beliefs at each information set, 
including information sets off-the-equilibrium path (i.e. information sets that 
have zero probability in equilibrium).
A sequential equilibrium 4 consists of a signaling rule nT(i) for S, an 
action rule a*(m) for R and beliefs p( Im) such that:
(i) m \t)e argmax us(t,m,a*(m));
(ii) a*(m)e argmax £ t6T uR(t,m,a)\i(tlm);
(iii) p(tlm) is computed from p(i), m and m‘(i) using Bayes’ rule, whenever 
applicable 5.
In words, (i) states that m*(f) maximizes S’s expected utility given R’s 
equilibrium strategy; (ii) states that a*(m) maximizes R’s expected utility given 
his posterior beliefs p( ); (iii) states that, after messages whose prior probability 
is positive, R’s beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule. After unexpected 
messages arbitrary posterior beliefs are allowed.
3We can write
m(t)={m: ps(mlt)>0 and 'Lm&Mp s(mlt)=l Vt} 
and
a(m)={a: pR(alm)>0 and ~£aeApR(alm) 'dm}
where ps(m/t) is the probability that S sends m given that his type is t and 
pR(a/m) is the probability that R chooses a after having received m.
4For signaling games the sets of sequential equilibria and Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibria coincide (Fudenberg-Tirole, 1991 p.346).
5That is:
P(t)ps(mlt)






























































































In a signaling game there may be multiple sequential equilibria 6. It is 
often the case that some are justified by more plausible beliefs than others. 
Accordingly, the refinement approach has tried to reduce the set of sequential 
equilibria by excluding unplausible beliefs.
Cho-Kreps’s (1987) refinement of sequential equilibrium (which they call 
the Intuitive Criterion) is based on equilibrium dominance and says that the 
receiver believes that an out-of-equilibrium message can only be sent by a type 
who can reasonably hope to gain from the deviation. Formally, let Mm) be the 
set of types who get less than their equilibrium payoff by choosing an out-of- 
equilibrium message m, provided R plays an undominated strategy: J(m)={t s.t. 
us*(t)>us(t,m,a'"(m))}. The equilibrium under consideration satisfies the Intuitive 
Criterion if, for any out-of-equilibrium message m, there is no type f  such that:
u*(t')< min us(t',m,a*{m))
where BR(T/J(m),m)=argmax 52 uR(t,a,a)[x(tlm)
Note the central role given by this criterion to the equilibrium under 
consideration, that is utility is confronted with the utility obtained in the given 
equilibrium.
A stronger criterion is divinity (Bank-Sobel, 1987) according to which 
it is less likely that one type of sender has deviated in a particular fashion than 
another type, if any response by the receiver that makes the first type willing 
to deviate makes also the second type willing to deviate 1.
The above mentioned criteria are both implied by Kohlberg-Mertens’ 
stability concept. A subset M of the Nash equilibria of a given game G is said 
to be stable if for any e>0 there is a 8>0 such that every game G,’ that is 
within 8 of G 8, has some Nash equilibrium that is less than € distant
6Some differ only for the inference they allow the receiver to make when 
observing out-of-equilibrium signals; others also for the final outcome.
7For a formal treatment of divinity and the related criterion of universal 
divinity see the original paper by Bank-Sobel or Fudenberg-Tirole (1991).
8More precisely, for any completely mixed strategy vector ps, pR and for any 




























































































(according to a predefined metric) from the set M. This means that, for any 
small perturbation of the strategy set that induces the players to play 
completely mixed strategies, there is an equilibrium "near" the set M. Strategic 
stability is a set-valued concept; that is, a solution is a set of connected 
components 9.
For our purpose the following two results of Kohlberg-Mertens are 
relevant:
PI: There exists a stable set which is contained in a single connected 
component o f the set o f Nash equilibria and every generic tree has a stable 
payoff (i.e. a payoff obtained in every equilibrium of a stable set).
P2: A stable set contains a stable set of any game obtained by deletion o f a 
strategy which is an inferior response in all the equilibria o f the set.
The first proposition states that a stable set exists and that stability is a 
refinement of Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since the stable set is contained in 
the set of divine equilibria which in mm is contained in the set of equilibria 
satisfying the Intuitive Criterion 10, PI ensures existence of them all. The 
second proposition captures the forward induction argument according to which 
past actions should be interpreted as signals of future intentions (even though 
those actions may not influence payoffs in the continuation game). 
Accordingly, strategies that are never a (weak) best response to any of the 
opponent’s strategy profiles in the component under consideration can be 
eliminated.
2 The ’Beer-Quiche’ Game
A famous signaling game, known in the literature as the ’Beer-Quiche’ 
game (Cho-Kreps, 1987), is the following: player S is one of two types: weak 
(W) with probability p(W) or tough (T) with probability p(T). He sends a 
signal to player R by choosing beer (B) or quiche (Q) for breakfast. The weak 
type of player S prefers quiche; the tough, beer. After having received the 
signal, player R decides whether to fight or not; he prefers to fight (F) if S is 
weak but he would rather not (D) if S is tough. Whether weak or tough, S 
prefers not to fight and he would rather have his least preferred breakfast than 
fight. The extensive form representation of the Beer-Quiche game is shown 
below:
intuitively, a connected set is such that any two points in the set can be 





























































































( 0 . 1 ) ( 1 . 1 )
The game has two sequential equilibria in pure strategies " .In  the first, 
the ’beer equilibrium’, the sender has beer for breakfast regardless of his type 
and the receiver replies F to Q and D to B. In the second, the ’quiche 
equilibrium’, both types of S have quiche for breakfast and R replies F to B 
and D to Q. The first equilibrium is rationalized by out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
p(W/Q)>‘/2. The second by ji(W/B)>1/2 12.
It is straightforward to see that the ’quiche equilibrium’ is not stable, it 
fails divinity and the Intuitive Criterion. To see why it is not stable, note that, 
in the ’quiche equilibrium’, drinking beer is never a weak best response for the 
weak type and therefore can be eliminated. Deleting the possibility for the 
weak type to drink beer causes D to be dominated by F. Thus by P2 the 
’quiche equilibrium’ is not stable. Moreover, it is not divine. In fact, since in 
this equilibrium the tough type is more willing to defect than the weak type, 
the relative probability of tough should increase if the receiver observes beer. 
However, to support the ’quiche equilibrium’ the receiver must believe that it 
is more likely that the weak type of sender has beer than the tough one. The 
’quiche equilibrium’ also fails the Intuitive Criterion. In fact, in this 
equilibrium, the weak type is getting its highest possible payoff and has no 
incentive to switch to drinking beer, regardless of how R would respond to
"Here we are referring to a set-value solution. That is, each "equilibrium" 
is a set of equilibria differing for the out-of-equilibrium beliefs allowed.




























































































beer: that is WeJ(B) 13. On the other hand, if the tough type could convince 
R of his type and thus induce him not to fight, he would obtain a higher payoff 
by switching to beer: us*(T)<us(T,B,D).
In the next section we present a model in which players update their 
beliefs following an adaptive rule; they choose a strategy (the sender a message 
and the receiver an action) that maximizes expected utility, given their beliefs, 
but sometimes make mistakes. By computer simulations it is shown that, in the 
perturbed system, the unique long run outcome is the ’beer equilibrium’.
3 The Model
Consider two populations of players: a population of senders and a 
population of receivers. Let N be the number of individuals in each 
population, v(W) be the number of weak individuals in the population of 
senders and w=v(W)/N (wciA).
Imagine that the basic game is repeated T times (T large) and in every 
period x each sender is randomly matched with a receiver who does not know 
the sender’s type but knows the proportion of weak individuals in the 
population of senders.
We make the following assumptions on players’ behaviour:
Al: All individuals in a population share the same beliefs. 14 Let p,(x) be the 
receiver’s belief at time x that the sender is weak given that he has chosen 
beer; p2(x) be the receiver’s belief at time x that the sender is weak given that 
he has chosen quiche; p3(x) be the sender’s belief at time x that the receiver 
responds fight to beer; p4(x) be the sender’s belief at time x that the receiver 
responds fight to quiche.
A2: At any time x, given p3(x) and p4(x) and knowing his own type, each 
sender chooses beer or quiche so as to maximize his current expected utility. 
A3: At any time x, given p,(x) and p2(x) and having received a message 
me{B,Q} from his matched opponent, each receiver chooses F or D so as to 
maximize his current expected utility, given beliefs about the opponent’s type. 
A4: With a given probability p each player makes a mistake and chooses 
randomly between the actions at his disposal and according to a probability
l3Recall that J(B) is the set of types who get less than their equilibrium 
payoff by choosing the out-of-equilibrium breakfast B.
14This captures the idea that all individuals in a population share the same 
information, either because each individual observes the outcome of every game 
played, or because society keeps records of what happens. More troublesome is 




























































































distribution that puts equal weight on each alternative 15.




where me{B,Q}; v(m) is the number o f times that the message m has been 
observed; X(m)=Xv(m)IN, 0<k<l; v(m,h(i)) is the number o f times that {m and 
h(i)} has been observed, h(i)=W for i=l,2 and h(i)=F for i=3,4. According to 
this rule beliefs are updated using new information: current beliefs are a 
weighted average of previous period’s beliefs and observed frequencies, with 
weights l-k(m) and k(m) respectively. If 7=0 then beliefs are static, that is to 
say, they do not change with new information; if A=1 then beliefs are solely 
determined by the behaviour observed in the previous period (no memory of 
the past).
4 Simulations’ Results
We consider the model with w=0.2, T=2,000 and 1=0.1 16 In the model 
without mistakes both sequential equilibria have a basin of attraction and the 
long run outcome depends on initial beliefs. The dynamics of players’ beliefs 
is shown in figures 1 to 3 for different initial conditions. In figure 1 initial 
beliefs are (.9, .1, .9, .1). After few repetitions the system setdes at beliefs (.9, 
.2, .9, 0) which are consistent with the ’quiche equilibrium’ 17. In fact, as can 
be seen in table 1, for the given initial beliefs the only actions ever observed 
are "quiche" for breakfast and "do not fight" as reply. Thus, since no 
observation intervenes to modify p, and p3 they remain at their initial value. 
With initial beliefs (.1, .9, .1, .9) and (.5, .5, .5, .5) the system quickly
15The idea that players sometimes make mistakes is clearly at odds with the 
interpretation that deviations from the equilibrium are due to conscious signaling 
or experimentation, as in Fudenberg-Kreps (1988). If an "unexpected" message 
is interpreted as a mistake then it contains no information about the sender’s 
type.
16In the simulations we have tried N=10 (thus v(W)=2) and N=100 (thus 
v(W)=20) obtaining the same results.
17The ’quiche equilibrium’ is characterized by p2=w, p4=0 and arbitrary p, 
and p2 can take any value. Analogously, the ’beer equilibrium’ is characterized 




























































































converges to the ’beer equilibrium’ (see table 1). The patterns of beliefs for 
these initial conditions are shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively. The 
comparison between figures 2 and 3 and table 1 confirms that out-of­
equilibrium beliefs can be arbitrary (in figure 2 p2=p4=.9 while in figure 3 
p2=p4=.5).
The introduction of mistakes by players greatly changes the dynamics of 
beliefs. With mistakes, every action has positive probability of being taken 
(and observed); therefore, p,>0 Vi. As it is shown in figures 4, 5 and 6, the 
introduction of mistakes leads the system "close" to the ’beer equilibrium’ for 
any initial distribution of beliefs (figures 4, 5 and 6 are obtained for the same 
initial conditions as figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively, but for a probability of 
mistake p=.l). Table 1 shows that, even if players’ beliefs cycle, their actions 
are, most of the time, close to the ’beer equilibrium’. A comparison of figures 
6, 7 and 8 suggests that the length of the cycle in players’ beliefs depends on 
the probability of mistake: the smaller is p the longer is the cycle. This is 
because with smaller p it takes longer for a given change in beliefs to occur 
(in the limit when p=0 no change in beliefs occurs). Note that, while changing, 
players’ beliefs remain such that no player has an incentive to deviate from the 
equilibrium, which is thus observed most of the time 18.
Changing A. does not affect the long run results but it affects the length 
of time in which the system is influenced by the initial conditions (with A=.001 
and p=.l it takes about 30.000 repetitions before the ’beer equilibrium’ is 
played) and the length of the cycle in players’ beliefs.
Changing the proportion of weak individuals in the population does not 
change significatively the results as far as this number is not greater than N/2
19
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown, with an example, that in signaling games 
adaptive learning can lead players to play according to a (sequential) 
equilibrium; moreover, by adding mistakes the learning dynamics provides an 
equilibrium selection device. Along the lines of Young (1993) we interpret this
18p4>p3+1/2 ensures that us(W,B,p3,p4)>us(W,Q,p3,p4); 
p ,<‘/2 ensures that ZleTuR(t,B,D)p(fB)>XtEXuR(t,B,F)p(t/B) where p(W/B)=p,; 
p2>Vi ensures that EteXuR(t,Q,F)p(t/Q)>ElETuR(t,Q,D)p(t/Q) where p(W/Q)=p2.
19When w>!/2, the unique sequential equilibrium is beer for the tough sender, 
the mixed strategy ((l-w)/w; (2w-l)/w)) for the weak sender and the mixed 




























































































last result as an indication that the ’beer equilibrium’ is the easier to get into 
"by mistake"; in fact, the tough sender is easily convinced to drink beer if he 
observes the (out-of-equilibrium) response F to quiche. Note that since the 
game is not weakly acyclic according to Young’s (1993) definition, 20 his 
results are not directly applicable here.
As compared to Fudenberg-Kreps (1988), which seem to need 
sophisticated experimentation, our example suggests that naive experimentation 
(mistakes) may be enough to rule out unplausible (sequential) equilibria in 
signaling games.





























































































Banks,J.B. and Sobel,J. (1987). Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games. 
Econometrica 55, 647-661.
Cho,I. and Kreps,D. (1987). Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics 102, 179-221.
Fudenberg,D. and Tirale,J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
Grossman,S. (1981). The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure about Product Quality. Journal o f Law and Economics, 461-483.
Kohlberg,E. and MertensJ.F (1986). On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria. 
Econometrica 54, 1003-1038.
Kreps,D. (1990). Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs and Out-of-Equilibrium Behaviour. 
In The Economics of Missing Markets Information and Games. F.Hahn 
editor.Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Kreps, D (1991). A course in Microeconomic Theory. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Kreps,D and Wilson,R (1982a). Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica 50, 863- 
894.
Kreps,D and Wilson,R (1982b). Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal 
of Economic Theory 27, 253-279.
Milgrom,P. and Roberts,J. (1982). Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete 
Information: An Equilibrium Analysis. Econometrica 50,443-460.
Milgrom,P. and Roberts,J. (1986). Price and Advertising Signals of Product 




























































































Table 1*: w=0.2, T=20,000,1=0.1.
Initial beliefs P WB WQ TB TQ BF BD QF QD
.9 .1 .9 .1 0 0 .2 0 .8 0 0 0 1
.1 .9 .1 .9 0 .2 0 .8 0 0 1 0 0
.5 .5 .5 .5 0 .2 0 .8 0 0 1 0 0
.9 .1 .9 .1 .1 .1 .1 .7 .1 0 .8 0 .1
.1 .9 .1 .9 .1 .2 0 .8 0 0 .9 0 0
.5 .5 .5 .5 .1 .2 0 .8 0 0 .9 0 0
.5 .5 .5 .5 .05 .2 0 .8 0 0 .9 0 0
.5 .5 .5 .5 .025 .2 0 .8 0 0 1 0 0
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Fig.l initial point (.9, .1, .9, .1) p=0
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Fig.3 initial point (.5, .5, .5, .5) p=0




























































































Fig.S initial point (.1, .9, .1, .9) p=.l
H_ P2_ P3_ Initial  Point: 50* 50* 50* 50*




























































































Fig.7 initial point (.5, .5, .5, .5) p=.05
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